Third Time’s the Charm: Will Basel III Have a Measurable Impact on Limiting Future Financial Turmoil? by Pentz, Erin
Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 
Volume 3 
Issue 1 3:1 
April 2014 
Third Time’s the Charm: Will Basel III Have a Measurable Impact 
on Limiting Future Financial Turmoil? 
Erin Pentz 
J.D. Candidate, 2014, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia 
 Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, 
International and Area Studies Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law 
Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Political Science Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and 




Erin Pentz, Comment, Third Time’s the Charm: Will Basel III Have a Measurable Impact on Limiting Future 
Financial Turmoil?, 3 Penn. St. J.L. & Int’l Aff. 261 (2014). 
The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs is a joint publication of Penn State’s School of Law and 
School of International Affairs. 
 
Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs 
2014 VOLUME 3 NO. 1 
THIRD TIME’S THE CHARM: WILL BASEL III 
HAVE A MEASURABLE IMPACT ON LIMITING 
FUTURE FINANCIAL TURMOIL? 
Erin Pentz* 
INTRODUCTION 
Although international economies have faced financial 
turmoil many times over the last century, the 2008 financial crisis 
brought catastrophic bank failures not seen since the Great 
Depression.1 Regulatory agencies responded swiftly to identify the 
source of the developing crisis and establish new rules to reduce 
vulnerability in the banking sector and prevent future crises.2 With 
the endorsement of the G-20 Leaders,3 the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision established the Basel III capital requirements to 
be implemented by all member nations4 by January 1, 2018.5 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State 
University. 
1 See Marilyn Geewax, Did the Great Recession Bring Back the 1930s?, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (July 11, 2012, 11:52 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/07/11/155991507/did-the-great-recession-bring-back-
the-1930s. 
2 Stefan Walter, Secretary General, Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision at the 5th Biennial Conference on Risk Management and Supervision: 
Basel III and Financial Stability (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm. 
3 Press Release, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Results of the 
Dec. 2010 Meeting (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.bis.org/press/p101201a.htm.  
4 Member nations include: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS 
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This comment will consider the feasibility of international 
banking regulations under Basel III as applied to varying economies. 
Part I will address the rise of “Too Big to Fail” financial institutions 
and their effect on international economies, which sparked the desire 
for uniform international banking standards.6 Part II will summarize 
historic international banking regulations and the failures of those 
measures that have set the groundwork for development of Basel 
III.7 
Part III will discuss the post-recession stability of varying 
economies, the level of pre-recession banking regulation in each of 
those economies, and the path each is taking to implement the Basel 
III standards.8 In Part IV, this comment will evaluate whether Basel 
III’s uniform application of banking regulation across highly differing 
economies is feasible or productive.9 
This comment concludes that Basel III is unlikely to have a 
major impact on the ability of financial sectors to weather economic 
storms. As a baseline measure, Basel III may hinder increased efforts 
for stability because its minimums are set with an eye towards 
concerns of competitiveness in the international marketplace. 
Historical practices show that changes to minimum capital 
requirements may be useless without strong financial regulation and 
diverse banking sectors. 
I. “TOO-BIG-TO-FAIL” 
The Secretary General of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, Stefan Walter summarized the general causes of banking 
crises as “excess leverage, too little capital of insufficient quality, and 
                                                 
AND BANKING SYSTEMS 1 n.1 (Dec. 2010) (rev. June 2011), [hereinafter BASEL III],  
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.  
5 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 10.  
6 See infra Part I. 
7 See infra Part II. 
8 See infra Part III. 
9 See infra Part IV.  
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inadequate liquidity buffers” to weather economic downturns.10 In 
the United States, Washington Mutual’s failure in 2008 was record 
breaking.11 With assets of $307 billion, but only about $188 billion in 
deposits, Washington Mutual simply had insufficient liquidity to 
outlast the collapse of the U.S. housing market.12 
The U.S. government did nothing to prevent the failure of 
Washington Mutual.13 However, in his speech in 2010, Walter 
recognized that some troubled banks could not be allowed to fail; 
some were simply “too-big-to-fail.”14 Certain financial institutions in 
both the U.S. and abroad15 have become so interconnected with the 
global financial system that failure could have repercussions that 
extend to the entire international banking system.16 Additionally, in 
nations with established insurance protocols to protect consumer 
deposits—for example, the United States’ Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC)—some financial institutions have become so 
large that available insurance funds may not adequately cover 
                                                 
10 Stefan Walter, Secretary General, Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 5th Biennial Conference on Risk Management and Supervision: Basel 
III and Financial Stability (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm. 
11 Regulator Sells Washington Mutual, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7637026.stm; Eric Dash & Andrew R. 
Sorkin, WaMu is Seized in Largest Bank Failure in U.S. History, STARTRIBUNE, Sept. 
25, 2008, http://www.startribune.com/business/29776529.html?refer=y. 
12 Regulator Sells Washington Mutual, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7637026.stm. 
13 Eric Dash & Andrew R. Sorkin, WaMu is Seized in Largest Bank Failure 
in U.S. History, STARTRIBUNE, Sept. 25, 2008, 
http://www.startribune.com/business/29776529.html?refer=y (Regulators 
brokered an emergency sale of nearly all of the bank’s assets, rather than injecting 
substantial sums of taxpayer dollars to prevent collapse). 
14 Stefan Walter, Secretary General, Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 5th Biennial Conference on Risk Management and Supervision: Basel 
III and Financial Stability (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm. 
15 The Financial Services Authority in the United Kingdom chose to 
nationalize Bradford & Bingley before it failed due to over-leveraging because 
failure may have harmed the banking system as a whole. Treasury to Nationalise B&B 
Bank, BBC NEWS (Sept. 28, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7640143.stm. 
16 Dash & Sorkin, supra note 13. 
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depositor losses in the event of the institution’s bankruptcy.17 If one 
of these large financial institutions failed, agencies like the FDIC 
would be forced either to seek additional funds from the government 
or to allow consumers to suffer.18 
One solution for governments facing the potential failure of a 
“Too-Big-to-Fail” institution has been for the government to inject 
capital, occasionally in substantial proportions, into the flailing 
institutions.19 In 2008, the government revived Citigroup, a U.S. 
financial institution with 200 million customers and branches in over 
100 countries, by injecting the bank with $45 million in capital.20 
First, the U.S. government attempted to recruit Wachovia, another 
major financial institution, to help Citigroup reduce risky assets and 
acquire low-cost funding.21 When the deal fell through, concerns 
about the effect of Citigroup’s potential bankruptcy inspired the U.S. 
to infuse millions in taxpayer dollars into the bank.22 
In the European Union (E.U.), governments are prohibited 
from injecting funds into the private sector.23 However, the extreme 
repercussions of the failure of “Too-Big-to-Fail” institutions has led 
to certain exceptions, such as the German banking sector’s injection 
of $4.8 billion into the failing IKB Deutsche Industriebank.24 
                                                 
17 Economists predicted that if Washington Mutual had not been seized 
and the FDIC was forced to insure consumer’s deposits, the funds available would 
not have been adequate. Regulator Sells Washington Mutual, BBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 
2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7637026.stm. 
18 Id. 
19 See David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup, WALL 
ST. JOURNAL, Nov. 24, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122747680752551447.html.  
20 Id. 
21 Tobias Buck, National Reputation Hangs on IKB Rescue, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 
2, 2007, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7017b0c0-411a-11dc-8f37-
0000779fd2ac.html - axzz2ABEJZjXP. 
22 Enrich, supra note 19. 
23 Buck, supra note 21. 
24 German banks, public and private, recognized the need to protect IKB 
or risk the reputation of the entire industry. They feared a perception of 
“insufficient risks standards” at German banks and reduced trust in the German 
banking system. Buck, supra note 21. 
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When possible, governments have facilitated mergers to 
avoid bailing out failing institutions using taxpayer dollars.25 When 
successful, mergers can help increase funding or decrease liquidity 
shortfalls by diversifying capital, as was the hope in the proposed 
Citigroup-Wachovia merger.26 In other instances, mergers can simply 
allow larger, more stable banks to absorb the assets and liabilities of 
failing institutions while increasing their own market share, as was the 
case in the United Kingdom based Lloyd’s TSB-Halifax Bank of 
Scotland merger.27 
One final solution, although utilized less frequently than 
other options, is the nationalization of failing banks. In 2007, the 
United Kingdom (U.K.) temporarily nationalized Northern Rock 
Bank after all other stabilization options seemed ineffective.28 
Taxpayers footed the bill to rescue the bank at a cost of nearly £55 
billion.29 
Although the government injection of capital, the facilitation 
of mergers, and the nationalization of private banks prevented the 
failure of major financial institutions during the Great Recession of 
2007-2009, the problems within the banking industry became the 
problems of the entire financial system due to the interconnectivity 
of the system.30 These problems have had long-lasting impacts on 
national economies.31 
                                                 
25 See Thousands Face Axe in HBOS Merger, BBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7622380.stm. 
26 Enrich, supra note 19. 
27 Thousands Face Axe in HBOS Merger, BBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7622380.stm. 
28 Northern Rock to be Nationalized, BBC NEWS (Feb. 17, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7249575.stm. 
29 Id.; see also Michael Steen & Peter T. Larsen, Dutch Alter Terms of Fortis 
Bail-out, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f93a9b08-
91ad-11dd-b5cd-0000779fd18c.html - axzz2H3FnY7f9 (discussing the Dutch 
government’s nationalization of banks Fortis and ABN Amro, after attempts to 
facilitate mergers failed to save the floundering institutions).  
30 See generally Jill Treanor, Toxic Shock: How the Banking Industry Created a 
Global Crisis, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2008), 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/apr/08/creditcrunch.banking. 
31 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 1. 
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II. THE BASEL ACCORDS: RESPONSES TO CRISES 
A.  The Basel Committee’s Purpose 
The Basel Committee on Baking Supervision (BCBS) is one 
of several committees within the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS).32 The BIS is not a consumer bank, but rather serves central 
banks to aid in establishing monetary and financial stability and 
international cooperation.33 BCBS was created to develop guidelines 
and supervisory standards for financial institutions and is best known 
for its development of international standards on capital adequacy.34 
The BCBS does not possess any actual legal authority; rather, it 
develops best practices and makes recommendations to supervisory 
leaders to help implement those initiatives endorsed by member 
nations.35 
B.  Historic Basel 
In 1988, the BCBS introduced a framework, known as the 
Basel Capital Accord or Basel I,36 designed to manage credit risk in 
major financial institutions through the establishment of minimum 
capital requirements.37 The initial iteration called for a minimum 
capital ratio38 of eight percent.39 Basel I was never intended to be a 
                                                 
32 About BIS, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).  
33 Established in 1930, BIS is the world’s oldest international financial 
institution. Id. 
34 About the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last updated Oct. 7, 2012). 
35 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, History of the Basel Committee 
and its Membership 1 (2009),  http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf. 
36 With the introduction of new iterations of the Basel Capital Accord, 
this first framework has become known as Basel I. About the Basel Committee, BANK 
FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last updated Oct. 
7, 2012). 
37 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, supra note 35, at 2. 
38 Established by factoring capital to risk-weighted assets (with risk based 
on the credit risk of the borrow). Id.  
39 Id. 
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static, long-term solution.40 Its evolution began in 1991,41 and its first 
amendment was published in 1995.42 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Basel I’s development 
continued with the addition of measures to manage market risk and 
improve evaluation of capital adequacy.43 Basel II was released in 
2004.44 The new framework focused on three main “pillars”: (1) 
minimum capital requirements; (2) supervisory review of an 
institution’s capital adequacy and internal assessment process; and (3) 
effective use of disclosure to encourage discipline and sound banking 
practices.45 Under Basel II, the minimum capital requirement 
remained at eight percent.46 However, unlike under Basel I, the BCBS 
required half of the total capital under Basel II to consist of Tier 1 
capital—the purest and most adequate form of capital (i.e. 
shareholder capital).47 Basel II also assigned more stringent risk 
weights to certain forms of investments and long-past-due loans.48 
Although implementation of Basel II effectively began in 
2004,49 the Great Recession began only a few short years later in 
2007.50 The causes of the Great Recession are many, but prominent 
commentators attributed bank failures to the insufficiency of capital 
                                                 
40 Id. at 3.  
41 Some critics argue that even early evolution could not save a scheme 
that was doomed to fail due to its crudely define risk categories and unfortunate 
incentives to increase risk, effectively reducing the capital banks actually held. 
Ranjit Lall, From Failure to Failure: The Politics of International Banking Regulation, 19 
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 609, 612 (2012).  




46 Just as under Basel I. See supra Part I. 
47 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework 12 (2004),  
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf. 
48 Id. at 27, 33 (assigning a risk weight of 150% to consumers whose 
credit is rated lower than a B- and to past due loans with less than 20% equity).  
49 See Basel II: Revised International Capital Framework, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) (for 
a detailed breakdown of the implementation timeline). 
50 See supra Introduction.  
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on bank balance sheets coupled with over-leveraging and insufficient 
liquidity buffers to weather downturns.51 Thus, the very problems 
that BCBS intended to avoid by introducing far-reaching 
international banking regulation were the causes of a crisis three years 
after Basel II’s implementation began.52 The result was the failure of 
443 financial institutions in the U.S. alone.53 
C.  Basel III 
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, the BCBS returned to the 
drawing board.54 Intent on “raising the resilience of the banking 
sector”, committee members took a five-fold approach to regulation: 
(1) raising the quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital 
base; (2) enhancing risk coverage; (3) supplementing the risk-based 
capital requirement with a leverage ratio; (4) promoting 
countercyclical buffers and capital conservation buffers; and (5) 
addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness.55 Specifically, Basel 
III made adjustments to the minimum capital requirement.56 
Although the total capital57 remained at eight percent,58 Tier 1 
Capital59 overall was raised to six percent, and Common Equity Tier 
1 Capital60 was raised to at least four-and-a-half percent of risk-
                                                 
51 Stefan Walter, Secretary General, Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 5th Biennial Conference on Risk Management and Supervision: Basel 
III and Financial Stability (Nov. 3, 2010),  
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101109a.htm. 
52 Id. 
53 Marilyn Geewax, Did the Great Recession Bring Back the 1930s?, NAT’L 
PUB. RADIO (July 11, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/11/155991507/did-
the-great-recession-bring-back-the-1930s. 
54 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 2. 
55 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 2-5, 7. 
56 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 12. 
57 Tier 1 Capital plus Tier 2 Capital. BASEL III, supra note 4, at 12. 
58 As in Basel I and Basel II. See supra Part II.B. 
59 Tier 1 Capital consists of Common Equity Capital, and instruments 
issued by the bank that meet the criteria outlined in Basel III, which may include 
subordinated instruments or those instruments with nearly negligible credit risk. 
BASEL III, supra note 4, at 15-17. 
60 Common Equity Tier 1 capital consists of common shares, stock 
surplus, retained earnings, and other accumulated income. BASEL III, supra note 4, 
at 13.  
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weighted assets.61 Basel III also established “stress testing” 
measures.62 
Basel III’s main focus has been the rise of “Too-Big-to-Fail” 
institutions.63 The BCBS worked with the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB)64 to determine which financial institutions met the status of 
“Too-Big-to-Fail”, or termed more specifically, “Systemically 
Important Banks”65 (SIBs), upon which Basel III will have the most 
significant impact.66 In November of 2011, the FSB released a list of 
29 SIBs, including eight U.S. banks, seventeen European banks, three 
Japanese banks, and one Chinese bank.67 The BCBS comment 
regarding SIBs recognized that some institutions are so large that 
individual operating procedures must be conducted with an eye 
towards the potential impact on the entire international banking 
                                                 
61 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 12. 
62 BASEL III, supra note 4, at 46. 
63 Agustino Fontevecchia, The 29 Global Banks that are Too Big to Fail, 
FORBES (Nov. 4, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/11/04/the-worlds-29-most-
systemically-important-banks/. 
64 The FSB was established to enhance cooperation among national and 
international supervisory boards and financial institutions. Membership spans the 
G20 countries, and the intent is to address vulnerabilities and develop and 
implement regulations and policies in the interest of advancing financial stability. 
The mandate of the FSB focuses on assessing vulnerabilities, promoting 
coordination, monitoring and advising markets and policies, and undertaking joint 
actions to plan and develop guidelines. About the FSB: Overview, FIN. STABILITY 
BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overview.htm (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2013).  
65 Defined as: “Financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, 
because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause 
significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity. To avoid 
this outcome, authorities have all too frequently had no choice but to forestall the 
failure of such institutions through public solvency support.” Fontevecchia, supra 
note 63. 
66 Press Release, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Dealing with 
Domestic Systemically Important Banks: Framework Issued by the Basel 
Committee (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.bis.org/press/p121011.htm.  
67 Fontevecchia, supra note 63. 
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system.68 For these 29 banks, BCBS created higher loss absorbency 
standards, which range from additional Common Equity Tier 1 
Capital of one percent to two-and-a-half percent greater than the 
non-SIB standard, depending on the size and systemic importance of 
the institution.69 The BCBS also discouraged these institutions from 
becoming even more systemically important.70 
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN IMPLEMENTATION EFFORTS 
A.  Canada 
The Canadian economy is one of the fifteen largest in the 
world (while occasionally breaking into the top ten).71 And yet, not 
one of its banks failed during the Great Recession.72 In fact, the 
Canadian economy survived the Great Recession relatively 
unscathed.73 
One of the potential sources of Canadian economic stability 
may be the drastic difference between the Canadian banking system 
                                                 
68 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Global Systemically Important 
Banks: Assessment Methodology and the Additional Loss Absorbency 
Requirement: Cover Note  (Nov. 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207cn.pdf.   
69 Press Release, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Measures for 
Global Systemically Important Banks Agreed by the Group of Governors and 
Heads of Supervision (June 25, 2011), http://www.bis.org/press/p110625.htm. 
70 Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Global Systemically Important 
Banks: Assessment Methodology and the Additional Loss Absorbency 
Requirement: Rules Text (Nov. 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.pdf. 
71 Kevin Carmichael, A Middling Grade for Canada in Latest Economic 
Ranking, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 17, 2011), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/economy-lab/a-
middling-grade-for-canada-in-latest-economic-ranking/article612747/. 
72 Mark Perry, Due North: Canada’s Marvelous Mortgage and Banking System, 
AM. (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.american.com/archive/2010/february/due-
north-canadas-marvelous-mortgage-and-banking-system. 
73 “In 2008, the World Economic Forum ranked Canada’s banking 
system the healthiest in the world. America’s ranked 40th, Britain’s 44th.” Fareed 
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and other industrialized nations.74 First, the Canadian banking system 
consists of five major banks out of a mere 82 banks in the entire 
country.75 These 82 banks benefit from great diversity across 
geographic regions.76 Because of the concentration of banks, 
coordination between the banks and regulators is facilitated.77 
Substantial discussions regarding best banking practices and 
brainstorming on methods to weather downturns are feasible and 
likely.78 
Second, the Canadian mortgage market has built-in 
protections that advance the stability of the banking system.79 For 
example, all mortgages in Canada are “Full Recourse” mortgages, 
meaning that a borrower remains fully responsible for any mortgage, 
even if the home has been foreclosed upon.80 This provides a lesser 
incentive for borrowers to walk away from mortgages81 while 
ensuring that lending institutions retain the ability to recoup all 
mortgage liabilities.82 Additionally, Canadian mortgage insurance is 
more widespread than in the U.S.,83 giving Canadian banks a 
guarantee of repayment for a significant portion of all mortgages. 
Finally, Canadian banks fix interest rates for only five years at a time 
for mortgages,84 retain a large portion of originated loans on their 
                                                 






80 Fareed Zakaria, Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 6, 
2009), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/02/06/worthwhile-
canadian-initiative.html. 
81 Economies not using full recourse mortgages incentivize the borrower 
to walk away from his home and his loan when times become tough. Id. 
82 Interestingly, home ownership in Canada is 69%, as compared to 
homeownership in the U.S. at 67.2%. Perry, supra note 72. 
83 Roughly half of all Canadian mortgages carry mortgage insurance; yet, 
in the U.S. pre-Great Recession, mortgage insurance was found on only fifteen 
percent of all mortgages and typically only on high leveraged mortgages with less 
than twenty percent equity. Id. 
84 Because rates are fixed for only a short time, every five years an 
adjustment to interest rates occurs, allowing the interest rates on mortgages to 
adjust with market conditions. Id. 
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own balance sheets,85 and engage in the subprime mortgage market to 
a lesser degree than banks in other major economies.86 
Additional sources of Canadian economic stability lie in the 
Country’s pre-Great Recession regulation of its banks. Canadian 
banks have maintained a strong regulatory framework since the 
economic crisis in the early 2000s.87 They are regulated on a federal 
level by four major regulatory agencies: The Department of 
Finance,88 the Bank of Canada,89 the Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions (OSFI),90 and the Canada Deposit Insurance 
Corporation.91 Each agency has a specific focus or area of expertise.92 
In addition, non-national banks are regulated by agencies at the 
provincial level.93 Canada also has several committees that facilitate 
collaboration between the regulatory agencies, both federal and 
provincial, so that all issues and regulations are addressed between 
the sister agencies on both a regional and national scale.94 Most 
importantly, however, is the “sunset clause” which causes all federal 
financial regulations to lapse every five years, ensuring that each of 
the above named agencies review financial legislation periodically for 
soundness.95 
                                                 
85 Canadian banks service sixty-eight percent of the mortgages they 
originate; therefore, they have a continued interest in the risk associated with each 
loan they write. Id.  
86 Id. 
87 During that same time period, however, U.S. and E.U. banks were 
loosening banking regulations to stimulate economic growth following the 
recession of 2001. Zakaria, supra note 80.  
88 The Department of Finance is responsible for the overall stability of 
the financial system and overarching financial sector legislation. FIN. STABILITY 
BOARD, PEER REVIEW OF CANADA 9 (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120130.pdf. 
89 The Bank of Canada assesses risk and provides liquidity to the 
Canadian financial system. Id.   
90 OSFI is the regulator and supervisor of federal Canadian financial 
institutions. Id. 
91 The Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation insures deposits of 
financial institutions. Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 10. 
94 Id. at 10-11.  
95 Id. at 11. 
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To increase stability further, Canadian regulatory agencies 
have mandated significant minimum capital requirements since 
1999.96 At that time, banks were required to meet or exceed seven 
percent Tier 1 capital ratios and ten percent total capital ratios.97 
Additionally, OSFI reserved the right to direct a bank to increase its 
capital through institution-specific requirements.98 Regulatory 
agencies also required Canadian banks to limit leverage to twenty-to-
one,99 and in 2009, Canadian banks were typically leveraged below 
that rate at eighteen-to-one.100 
Overall, no one element has led to the strength of the 
Canadian economy. Certainly the development of a strong regulatory 
framework, the self-protecting practices of the lending market, and 
the comparatively high capital requirements101 in the banking sector 
had a major impact on the stability of Canadian financial institutions. 
Nonetheless, Canada, as a member of the G-20, is taking steps to 
make changes following Basel III’s adoption. 
The OSFI established a plan to complete its interpretation of 
Basel III requirements by the end of 2012 and began implementation 
in the first fiscal quarter of 2013.102 In its plan, all deposit-taking 
institutions were required to meet the seven percent Tier 1 target.103 
Although Canadian deposit institutions were previously required to 
meet a seven percent Tier 1 minimum, OSFI recognized that some 
institutions may have fallen below the minimum as a result of 
pressure from international financial instability.104 OSFI, therefore, 
                                                 
96 Id. at 12. 
97 Id.; Compare supra Section III.B. and III.C. for a discussion of Basel II 
and Basel III capital requirements.  
98 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 88, at 12. 
99 Id.  
100 Zakaria, supra note 80. 
101 See supra Section III. As compared to the overall requirements under 
the Basel models.  
102 Press Release, Office of the Superintendent of Fin. Insts. Canada, 
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recognized that banks should continue to “maintain prudent earnings 
retention policies and avoid actions that weaken their capital 
position.”105 Additionally, OSFI acknowledged that its current 
leverage ratio calculation did not necessarily conform with the Basel 
III rules, but intended not to take steps to alter its own ratios and 
monitoring until the Basel III leverage ratio was finalized.106 Finally, 
OSFI made no plans to begin implementation of the liquidity 
coverage ratio until BCBS deemed such actions necessary.107 Rather, 
OSFI planned to work with small banks and foreign bank branches 
to determine how the new metrics established under Basel III might 
work with their operations.108 
In addition to the minimum capital requirements, OSFI 
addressed the quality of capital necessary under Basel III. It planned a 
mandatory requirement that all non-common share capital 
instruments contain a provision in their contract terms that allows for 
the conversion to common share capital upon a triggering event.109 
Specifically, OSFI established regulations allowing the mandate of a 
full and permanent conversion of the class of capital if OSFI 
determines that the financial institution’s viability has ceased or the 
Canadian government has decided to support the financial institution 
for any other reason.110 OSFI also encouraged financial institutions to 
confirm the quality of capital with OSFI111 prior to issuing 
questionable capital instruments.112 Additionally, financial institutions 
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 88, at 15. 
108 Id. 
109 Press Release, Office of the Superintendent of Fin. Insts. Canada, 
Non-Viability Contingent Capital (Aug. 2011), http://www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/advisories/nvcc_e.pdf.  
110 Id.; see also John Greenwood, Canadian Banks Stronger Than They Look: 
OSFI, FIN. POST (May 8, 2013), 
http://business.financialpost.com/2013/05/08/osfi-canadian-banks-stronger-
than-they-look/. 
111 Although such action is encouraged, OSFI has no current intention to 
make confirmation of quality of capital mandatory. Press Release, Office of the 
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are instructed to redeem any capital instruments that do not meet 
Basel III standards at their regular redemption dates, rather than 
waiting for regulatory events to trigger redemption.113 
The BCSB and FSB did not include any Canadian banks on 
the SIB list.114 As a result, OSFI and other Canadian regulatory 
agencies were not required to establish heightened minimum capital 
requirements for its largest financial institutions.115 Overall, because 
Canada has no SIBs, already has substantial minimum capital 
requirements for financial institutions, and intends to make no 
additional changes until Basel III liquidity and leverage ratios are 
finalized, Canadian financial institutions will be in substantial 
compliance with Basel III goals from its implementation in the first 
fiscal quarter of 2013. 
B.  Switzerland 
Switzerland has long been known as one of the safest places 
in the world for affluent individuals to store their wealth.116 Prior to 
the Great Recession, Swiss banks held assets worth more than six 
times the country’s overall gross domestic product (GDP).117 In 
comparison, U.S. banks held assets totaling a mere seventy percent of 
                                                 
113 Press Release, Office of the Superintendent of Fin. Insts. Canada, 
Treatment of Non-qualifying Capital Instruments (Feb. 2011), http://www.osfi-
bsif.gc.ca/app/DocRepository/1/eng/guidelines/capital/advisories/nqcibIII_e.pd
f.  
114 See supra Part II.C. 
115 See supra Part II.C. Although no Canadian banks were included on the 
SIB list, the OSFI designated all of Canada’s six largest banks as domestic 
systemically important banks. These six banks are subject to a 1% risk-weighted 
capital surcharge and subject to continued supervisory intensity and enhanced 
disclosure requirements. Stephen B. Kerr, Canadian Banks Come to Grips with Basel 
III, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a815f72b-005e-43b0-b366-
0a52f62cda12. 
116 Craig Whitlock, Banking Crisis Has Made Even the Swiss Uneasy, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 15, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/story/2008/10/15/ST2008101500708.html.  
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its GDP during the same time period.118 The sheer size of the Swiss 
banking sector compared to the Swiss economy substantiates the 
importance of financial stability to the country. 
Two major banks, UBS and Credit Suisse, dominate the Swiss 
banking sector.119 Together, UBS and Credit Suisse held $2.85 trillion 
in assets before the Great Recession, totaling more than four times 
Switzerland’s GDP at the time.120 UBS and Credit Suisse operate 
internationally and focus on investment banking and wealth 
management, with half of the wealth management assets coming 
from foreign clients.121 The Swiss banking sector is also composed of 
cantonal banks122 and other regional banks that operate 
domestically.123 
In 2008, when the Great Recession began and international 
financial institutions began failing, the Swiss government looked to 
UBS and Credit Suisse as possible sources of economic instability.124 
Because of the size of the two banks, Swiss agencies recognized that 
the Swiss economy was simply not large enough to bail out the banks 
if they failed125 and feared that collapse in either could throw the 
entire country into financial turmoil.126 
                                                 
118 Id. 
119 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, PEER REVIEW OF SWITZERLAND 9 (Jan. 25, 
2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_250112.pdf.  
120 In 2011, the assets of UBS and Credit Suisse totaled more than twice 
Switzerland’s GDP, a sharp reduction from 2007-2008 dominance. Id.; Whitlock, 
supra note 116.  
121 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 9 n.3. 
122 Cantonal banks operate within Switzerland’s individual cantons, or 
states, typically servicing only individual cantons and owned either entirely or in the 
large majority by the canton. As of early 2013, 24 cantonal banks exist. Cantonal 
Banks, CANTONAL BANK, 
http://www.kantonalbank.ch/e/gruppe/kantonalbanken/index.php (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2013). 
123 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 9. 
124 Whitlock, supra note 116. 
125 Theil, supra note 117.  
126 Whitlock, supra note 116. 
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In the same time period, as a result of aggressive expansion to 
its investment banking business, UBS found itself in trouble.127 The 
bank quickly secured billions in capital from new share offerings and 
injections from international investors and governments,128 but the 
effort was insufficient to stabilize the bank.129 As a result, the Swiss 
government took additional steps to secure the bank.130 The Swiss 
central bank nationalized $54 billion131 of UBS’s assets and 
recapitalized the remaining private assets.132 UBS did not fail as a 
result of the financial crisis, but public perception of the bank did not 
recover from the negativity surrounding its instability.133 
Credit Suisse also suffered major losses as a result of the 
financial crisis.134 However, unlike UBS, a capital injection from 
international investors was sufficient to prevent the need for 
government intervention.135 
The smaller Swiss banking institutions did not face similar 
struggles during the financial crisis.136 Instead, they were able to gain 
market share at the expense of UBS’ and Credit Suisse’s questionable 
                                                 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Theil, supra note 117. 
130 Id. 
131 Alan Cowell, UBS and Credit Suisse get Urgent Bailout Funds, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct.16, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/16/business/worldbusiness/16iht-
17swiss.17006058.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013).  
132 Theil, supra note 117. 
133 See Whitlock, supra note 116. 
134 Totaling $19 billion in comparison to UBS’s $53 billion in losses from 
2007 until 2009. FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 11 n.10.  
135 Alan Cowell, UBS and Credit Suisse get Urgent Bailout Funds, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 16, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/16/business/worldbusiness/16iht-
17swiss.17006058.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 4 2013). 
136 See FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 7; SWISS FIN. MKT. 
SUPERVISORY AUTH. FINMA, FINANCIAL MARKET CRISIS AND FINANCIAL 
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stability.137 Cantonal banks, in particular, were well capitalized, had 
higher quality capital than the two largest banks, and in some cases, 
had their liabilities fully guaranteed by their cantons.138 Each of these 
factors led to stability during the crisis. 
Three agencies regulate the Swiss financial market.139 The 
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) is the 
supervisory and regulatory authority responsible for the financial 
industry.140 It was created in 2007 but did not receive full power until 
2009.141 FINMA works in conjunction with the Swiss National Bank 
(SNB), the nation’s central bank in charge of monetary policy,142 and 
the Federal Department of Finance (FDF), the nation’s ministry of 
finance in charge of policy.143 
As a result of the 2008 financial crisis, Swiss regulatory 
agencies moved quickly to ensure the stability of its two largest banks 
and to begin tightening banking regulations concerning capital 
minimums and adequacy.144 During this time, FINMA mandated 
quarterly “stress-testing” to determine risk within each institution.145 
FINMA, working with SNB, also set new capital standards for the 
two major banks, requiring each institution to hold ten percent Tier 1 
Common Equity capital by 2018.146 Additionally, UBS and Credit 
                                                 
137 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 7; SWISS FIN. MKT. 
SUPERVISORY AUTH. FINMA, FINANCIAL MARKET CRISIS AND FINANCIAL 
MARKET SUPERVISION 15 (Sept. 14. 2009),  
http://www.finma.ch/e/aktuell/Documents/Finanzmarktkrise-und-
Finanzmarktaufsicht_e.pdf. 
138 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 7.  
139 See id. at 10.  
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 FINMA, Memorandum of Understanding in the Field of Financial 
Stability Between the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority FINMA and 
the Swiss National Bank SNB 1 (Feb. 23, 2010),  
http://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/mofu/source.  
143 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 10. 
144 Id. at 12. 
145 Id. at 25 
146 Swiss Banks get Stricter Rules than Basel III, SWISS BROADCASTING CORP., 
Oct. 4, 2010, 
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Suisse will be mandated to increase their current total capital 
requirements to nineteen percent after including nine percent 
contingent convertible bonds.147  Contingent convertible bonds are 
newly developed instruments that would commit their holders to buy 
shares from the banks in times of dire financial straits.148 For cantonal 
and smaller banks, the Basel III framework’s eight percent minimum 
capital requirement is expected to be adopted into Swiss law, with 
complete implementation by 2019.149 
The Swiss Bankers Association predicted in 2010 that Swiss 
authorities would pressure international agencies like the BCBS to 
adopt strict standards equal to those the Swiss agencies previously 
adopted.150 When the Basel III requirements were subsequently 
approved, however, swift acting Swiss agencies were forced to 
confront the reality that such extreme differences in regulations could 
have a negative impact on the Swiss financial sector.151 UBS and 
Credit Suisse’s heightened capital requirements could easily impact 
Switzerland’s international competitiveness in an already competitive 
market.152 
Through the fourth quarter of 2012, UBS struggled greatly to 
remain competitive in its investment banking business, experiencing a 
$2.3 billion loss in the third quarter of 2012.153 The bank also 
announced plans to lay off more than 10,000 workers over a three-
year period.154 Credit Suisse faced similar problems and potential 






149 FIN. STABILITY BOARD, supra note 119, at 14. 
150 Matthew Allen, Swiss Banking Regulation Leads the Field, SWISS 
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151 Tim Devaney, Global Crisis Squeezes Swiss Banks, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
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restructuring, but with a smaller investment banking business, the 
pressure to drop the entire business segment was not as great as that 
which UBS faced.155 This deteriorating effect on risky investment 
banking may likely have been well within the Swiss regulators’ 
intentions when it implemented more stringent capital regulations 
than those adopted under Basel III.156 
In addition to its struggling investment banking business, 
UBS stopped paying dividends, hoping that holding onto retained 
earnings would help it secure the required minimum capital.157 Credit 
Suisse, reporting solid progress towards the new capital minimum 
goals, continued to pay dividends to its shareholders.158 
Unfortunately, the bank lagged far behind competitors abroad when 
using Basel III159 standards to evaluate capital adequacy.160 Although 
some approaches to valuation projected Credit Suisse’s 2012 Tier 1 
capital above the benchmark required by Swiss law after full 
implementation in 2019, financial services firm Barclays applied new 
capital adequacy standards to Credit Suisse’s assets and projected just 
under six percent adjusted capital.161 
                                                 
155 Id.; see also David Jolly & Chad Bray, Credit Suisse to Streamline and 
Shrink, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 24, 2013, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/24/credit-suisse-profits-rise-but-results-
fall-short-of-expectations/?_r=1. 
156 Swiss Banks get Stricter Rules than Basel III, SWISS BROADCASTING CORP., 




157 As of June 2012, UBS held seven-and-a-half percent Tier 1 capital 
under Basel III’s capital adequacy standards. Julia Werdigier, Switzerland and Britain 
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Although Swiss banking is synonymous with safety, the 
structure of the industry showed stability issues that may have 
remained hidden without the widespread international financial 
turmoil of the Great Recession. Switzerland’s quick action was likely 
facilitated by its small regulatory system and may have aided the 
country in warding off major problems. Yet, such swift action may 
reduce industry competitiveness in the future when Swiss banks vie 
for business against institutions following Basel III’s requirements.162 
Furthermore, implementation may prove to be a burdensome if not 
impractical task. 
C.  European Union 
The European Union’s financial industry saw some of the 
earliest turmoil during the Great Recession.163 In fact, as early as 
August 2007, Deutsche Bank and other private German lending 
institutions were forced to inject $4.8 billion in capital to save the 
struggling IKB Deutsche Industriebank.164 Shortly thereafter in 
September 2007, the Bank of England provided emergency aid to 
Northern Rock.165 Since those initial rescues, and as recently as June 
of 2012,166 E.U. member countries chose to rescue major banks 
within their financial sector.167 The size and importance of many 
                                                 
162 See UBS Profits Slide, Risk Assets High Ahead of Stress Tests, IFA 
MAGAZINE, Oct. 29. 2013, http://www.ifamagazine.com/news/ubs-profits-slide-
risk-assets-high-ahead-of-stress-tests-286230. 
163 See Tobias Buck, National Reputation Hangs on IKB Rescue, FIN. TIMES, 
Aug. 2, 2007, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7017b0c0-411a-11dc-8f37-
0000779fd2ac.html - axzz2ABEJZjXP. 
164 Id 
165 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP ON 
REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF THE EU BANKING SECTOR 5 (Oct. 2, 2012),  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-
level_expert_group/report_en.pdf. 
166 Alan Wheatley, Proud, Too-Big-to-Fail Spain Ponder Bank Rescue, 
REUTERS, June 7, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/07/us-spain-
europe-outlook-idUSBRE85619U20120607. 
167 Landon Thomas & Nelson Schwartz, In Euro Zone, Banking Fear Feeds 
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European banks means that countries cannot allow banks to fail 
without compromising the stability of the E.U.’s entire economy.168 
The framework of the European banking sector is 
complex.169 Although the E.U. is made up of seventeen independent 
banking systems using a singular currency,170 since the adoption of 
the Euro, financial integration across member states increased up 
until the Great Recession.171 The European banking sector as a whole 
is large, even when compared to other major financial 
powerhouses.172 Banking sector assets are five times as great in the 
E.U. than in the U.S., and make up about 350% of the E.U.’s 
GDP.173 The United Kingdom, Germany, and France are home to 
the largest banking sectors when measured by total assets.174 
Additionally, the size of individual financial institutions within the 
E.U. is great—half of the world’s thirty largest banks when ranked by 
total assets are in the E.U.175 Specifically, fifteen of the twenty-nine 
SIBs176 are located in E.U. member countries.177 However, the E.U. is 
not made up exclusively of large financial institutions, as Europe is 
home to more than 8,000 banks with smaller institutions comprising 
a quarter of total banking assets in the E.U.178 
                                                 
168 Stephen Castle, Europe to Approve Guidelines on Bank Failures, N.Y. 
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The integration of the E.U. financial network across member 
countries increases need for a stable banking industry because failure 
in any of the major banks within a single member country raises the 
likelihood of economic crisis affecting multiple member countries.179 
As a result of such overlap and potential repercussions of bank 
failures, E.U. governments recognized the compelling need to inject 
funding into the private sector, even though such action violates 
traditional E.U. policy.180 In addition, in 2010, the E.U. chose to 
create the European Banking Authority (EBA).181 The E.U. had a 
predecessor advisory group,182 but the EBA is the first body with the 
power to create a singular E.U. rulebook that will be binding on all 
E.U. banks.183 In December of 2012, the E.U. also agreed to expand 
the European Central Bank’s (ECB) supervisory power to include 
direct supervision of the largest 100 to 200 banks in the E.U.184 
Previously, banks were overseen primarily by national regulators.185 
Under the agreement, smaller banking institutions would remain 
subject to their current regulators.186 The aim of ECB in its improved 
                                                 
179 Stephen Castle, Europe to Approve Guidelines on Bank Failures, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008, 
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181 Council Regulation 1093/2010, 2010 O.J. (L331), 12-47  http://eur-
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183 Matthew Elderfield, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland 
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CDU/CSU Congress in the Bundestag: European Banking Regulation and the 
Eurozone Crisis (Mar. 26, 2012),  http://www.bis.org/review/r120327f.pdf. 
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TIMES, Dec. 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/14/business/global/eu-
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note 165, at 107. 
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state is to create uniformity and reduce the domestic political 
influences that permeated the national banking regulation scheme.187 
Leading up to the Great Recession and in response to the 
Basel I and II frameworks, the E.U. passed two directives designed to 
implement minimum capital requirements.188 These directives were 
known as Capital Requirements Directives (CRD) I and II, and were 
packages of non-binding legislation designed to implement the 
various aspects of Basel I and II.189 Each directive established a 
minimum and total common equity requirement of two percent,190 
and each required no countercyclical buffer and no capital 
conservation buffer, but permitted banks to use their own internal 
risk models to calculate risk weights.191 Additionally, because CRD I 
and CRD II were directives, they were not binding.192 Rather, they 
were merely legislative acts that set out goals for each EU state to 
achieve, and member states were permitted to diverge significantly in 
their own individual implementations.193 In fact, some member states 
chose a transitional opt-out of the standards.194 Moreover, leverage 
ratios in European banks often exceed thirty-to-one, and in some 
cases, are as great as fifty-to-one.195 
                                                 
187 Peter Gumble, Too European To Fail? New E.U. Banking Safety Net Takes 
Shape, TIME, Dec. 17, 2012, http://business.time.com/2012/12/17/too-european-
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COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/regcapital/repealed-
legislation_en.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2014). 
190 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 165, at 11. 
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Jan. 31, 2014), for a brief overview of European law.  
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Under the E.U. legislation implementing Basel III, CRD IV, 
the capital requirements generally follow those outlined by BIS.196 
Total capital requirements under the legislation are eight percent, a 
total of four-and-a-half percent of which must be common Tier 1 
capital.197 The E.U. differs from Basel III requirements in that the 
percentage of Tier 1 capital must be gradually increased until it 
reaches six percent by 2019.198 The legislation also permits member 
states, in coordination with the E.U., to require higher levels than 
those established under CRD IV.199 Unlike previous regulations, 
however, the E.U. will enforce the law as a mandatory regulation, 
rather than a directive, to reduce the ability of national regulators to 
diverge or reduce the weight of the proposal.200 Although the 
percentages of capital remain consistent with the aims of Basel III, 
the E.U. legislation does diverge on certain details.201 Specifically, the 
E.U. counts as Tier 1 capital lesser types of capital202 than those 
supplied under Basel III and places a maximum on the capital ratio 
that member states may impose on their banks.203 
Even though the E.U. took steps to increase the stability of 
its financial sector by increasing union-wide banking regulations for 
the first time since the formation of the E.U., it failed to meet a 
major benchmark in Basel III implementation.204 The E.U.’s new 
minimum capital rules would complement the creation of the 
banking-union and create a measure for the ECB to enforce through 
                                                 
196 Compare BASEL III, supra note 4, at 2, with EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
supra note 165, at 69. 
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its new supervisory powers.205 However, the E.U. failed to pass Basel 
III regulation by the January 1, 2013 deadline established by BIS.206 
Although the E.U. legislature recognized the need for stronger 
regulation of the banking industry, given the systemic importance of 
the many E.U. banks, passing new minimum capital measures before 
other competitive nations (such as the U.S.) could have compromised 
the recovery of the E.U. financial sector and may have been the 
major cause for the delay.207 The regulation was adopted on June 27, 
2013 with implementation set to commence on January 1, 2014 and 
full implementation to be reached by 2019.208 
IV. IS UNIFORMITY POSSIBLE? 
Enacting capital requirements for financial institutions across 
industrialized nations seems to be the most basic step in preventing 
the recurrence of financial turmoil similar to that of the Great 
Recession. Establishing minimum capital levels for banks, with 
increased requirements for large, systemically important institutions, 
may help institutions weather the storm of financial strife so that 
banks do not go bankrupt or suffer bank runs.209 
Several major problems exist with Basel III. Because Basel III 
is a recommendation of best practices, introduced with no legal 
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authority from BCBS, countries may modify the terms or fail to 
implement the measures altogether. The E.U.’s passage of directives 
concerning Basel I and II and national failures to adopt such 
measures are a stark example of the ineffectiveness of 
recommendations lacking legal authority.210 As mentioned above, 
after the directive implementing Basel I and II, some E.U. member 
states failed to follow through with their own regulations by taking 
advantage of a transitional opt-out period. Still many E.U. member 
states failed to ever follow through with implementation of the new 
regulations. 
Basel III implementation may face difficulties similar to Basel 
I and II in the E.U. The initial deadline for Basel III implementation 
to begin was January 1, 2013. Sixteen members of the G-20 did not 
meet that benchmark.211 However, one year later, the majority of the 
G-20 took steps to implement some form of Basel III regulation, 
with most becoming effective on January 1, 2014.212 
Of those member nations that chose to follow through with 
implementing Basel III regulations, the risk remains that the intent of 
Basel III will be diluted by changes at the national level. Switzerland 
has stepped up the recommendations of Basel III.213 However, by 
acting ahead of the final Basel III recommendations, Swiss banks 
may face a disadvantage in competitiveness.214 Nations slow to follow 
through with implementation may recognize the Swiss setback and 
set standards below those recommended under Basel III to protect 
the competitiveness and recovery of their own banking institutions. 
Further, the E.U., although adopting the minimum ratios, intends to 
                                                 
210 The E.U. proposal for Basel III implementation will likely take the 
form of a mandatory regulation to correct the problem of previous iterations. See 
supra pp. 22-23. 
211 Brinded, supra note 206.  
212 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Progress Report on 
Implementation of the Basel Regulatory Framework 4-13 (2013),  
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs263.pdf. 
213 See supra pp. 17-18. 
214 Matthew Allen, Swiss Banking Regulation Leads the Field, SWISS 
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diverge from Basel III’s capital adequacy standards.215 The E.U. will 
accept lesser forms of capital than those suggested by Basel III as 
Tier 1, diluting the effectiveness of the minimum Tier 1 capital ratio 
established by the BCBS.216 
Finally, the minimum recommendation may be deceiving as a 
baseline measure because it may ultimately function as a maximum 
requirement. Switzerland recognized the need for greater 
requirements than those suggested by Basel III in order to protect its 
massive institutions and the media responded with concerns 
regarding competitiveness.217 Conversely, it is speculated that the 
E.U.’s delay in passing a final measure concerned the feared lack of 
competitiveness with the U.S. market due to the U.S.’s failure to meet 
the same deadline.218 Thus, many nations may look to the actions of 
their peers and focus on competitiveness rather than stability, 
choosing not to enforce minimums above those established under 
Basel III even if such a choice is made at the expense of their 
financial sector’s stability. 
The Canadian financial sector is a great example of the 
positive effects of maintaining certain levels of capital has on the 
stability of a financial industry. As discussed in Part IV.A, Canadian 
regulations leading up to the Great Recession required Tier 1 and 
overall capital ratios just above those established by Basel III. In 
effect, the Canadian banking sector experienced no bank failures and 
managed to thrive while the international economy floundered.219 
Alternatively, the E.U. member states stand as a prime example that 
bank failures or necessary rescues may occur when capital minimums 
                                                 
215 See supra pp. 22-23.  
216 Additionally, the E.U. proposal of a maximum capital ratio is 
troubling in light of the stabilizing aims of Basel III because banks should not be 
discouraged from favoring stability over competitiveness in a systemically 
important industry. See supra pp. 22-23.  
217 Allen, supra note 214.  
218 Europe ‘to Push for Basel III Delay as it Lobbies U.S.,’ TELEGRAPH (Nov. 
12, 2012), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9704822/Eu
rope-to-push-for-Basel-III-delay-as-it-lobbies-US.html; see also supra, Part III.C. 
219 See supra p. 9, notes 72-74. 
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and liquidity are insufficient to weather downturns in related financial 
markets and economies.220 
Conversely, although Swiss regulators have traditionally gone 
above and beyond recommended standards, including those under 
Basel I,221 Swiss banking institutions struggled to maintain stability 
during the Great Recession.222 In Switzerland, it was not the lack of 
capital alone that worried regulators. Rather, the sheer size of Swiss 
major banking institutions and the perceived inability of the 
government to bail out the institutions if they failed caused concern. 
It took a combination of international investors, nationalization of 
assets, and recapitalization of private assets to secure the fates of the 
largest institutions, even with minimum capital safeguards.223 
Establishing minimum capital requirements may be a step 
towards stabilizing banking sectors,224 but those measures alone, as 
evidenced by Switzerland’s struggles, are insufficient to offer broad 
protection to the banking industry. From an analysis and comparison 
of the Canadian, Swiss, and E.U. financial industries, certain other 
factors appear to be necessary for long-term stability. 
Using Canada as a blueprint, it appears that emphasis on a 
strong regulatory framework, control of the size of institutions, and 
strong coordination between institutions and regulators is necessary 
for resiliency in the banking industry.225 Both Switzerland and the 
                                                 
220 See supra pp.19-20. 
221 Press Release, Swiss Federal Banking Commission, Implementation of 
Basel II in Switzerland (Apr. 2004),  
http://www.finma.ch/archiv/ebk/e/archiv/2004/20040429/Referat_Z_E.pdf. 
222 See supra Part III.B. (discussing the Swiss banking crisis in 2008). 
223 See supra Part III.B. 
224 The author recognizes that capital adequacy and minimums are not 
the sole focus of Basel III, however, points out that the “five-fold approach” of 
Basel III (raising the quality, consistency, and transparency of the capital base; 
enhancing risk coverage; supplementing the risk-based capital requirement with a 
leverage ratio; promoting countercyclical buffers and capital conservation buffers; 
and addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness) focuses on these measures as 
the saving grace of the regulation. 
225 No doubt, the use of “sunset clauses,” strict lending laws favoring 
creditors, and diversified financial institutions contribute to the strength of the 
industry. See discussion supra Part III.A.  
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E.U. seem to have recognized the importance of strong financial 
regulatory bodies, with each creating a new regulatory agency in the 
wake of the Great Recession.226 
Further, the Great Recession has brought about financial 
institutions larger than those pre-Recession due to buyouts and 
mergers.227 Because half of the world’s SIBs lie in Europe, the 
stability of the region’s financial sector may be increased by the 
reduction of such systemically important institutions.228 Basel III 
acknowledges the necessity of regulating SIBs;229 however, if the E.U. 
fails to take major steps towards regulation and size limitation, the 
presence of so many major institutions could prove destructive to its 
long-term financial stability.230 Switzerland has already taken major 
steps to protect its two largest institutions, but long-term monitoring 
will likely be necessary for its continued stability.231 
One final element to long-term stability may rest less on the 
regulations placed on the financial industry and more on the actions 
and goals of the industry itself. Canadian banks, for instance, seem to 
focus on the good of its economy and the long-term viability and 
success of its financial industry as the primary goals. Competitiveness 
in, and dominance of, the international financial sector appear not to 
be major focuses of business in Canada.232 In contrast, Switzerland 
and the E.U. both have concerns about international competitiveness 
as a result of new minimum capital and liquidity requirements, 
appearing to deemphasize the resiliency and long-term viability of 
their banking sectors. Although the Canadian difference may be a 
cultural one, it should be a role model for other nations struggling to 
keep their banking industries and economies afloat. 
                                                 
226 See supra Parts III.B., III.C. 
227 See supra Part I. 
228 See supra pp. 20-21. 
229 See supra pp. 8-9.  
230 See supra Part III.C. 
231 See supra Part III.B. 
232 See supra Part III.A. 
 
2014 Student Work 3:1 
291 
CONCLUSION 
As international economies began to suffer financial distress 
as a result of the Great Recession, the Bank for International 
Settlements and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
gathered with leaders of the G-20 to modify international banking 
standards to secure the stability of financial institutions. With the 
agreement known as Basel III, the Basel Committee recommended 
that members of the G-20 agree on national regulations with 
increased minimum capital and liquidity requirements for banks 
within their countries to help prevent future banking failures and the 
resultant impact such failures have on individual economies. 
Although some nations, such as Canada and Switzerland met the 
January 1, 2013 deadline, others, such as the E.U. and U.S. failed to 
do so. 
Basel III, in its most basic form, appears to be a strong 
solution and response to the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008. Upon 
examination of divergent economies and a study of pre-Recession 
banking regulation, it becomes clear that standards which focus on 
capital and liquidity alone are not sufficient to prevent struggles in the 
banking sector. The measure, although agreed upon by members of 
the G-20, is plagued with difficulties that will limit its effectiveness. 
The ability of nations to dilute the recommendations or fail to 
implement the regulations altogether will likely have a detrimental 
effect on the sufficiency of Basel III. Additionally, earlier iterations 
have failed to prevent financial crises, and it is unlikely the third 
iteration will be any different without substantial changes to national 
financial regulation as a whole. Although any strengthening of the 
financial industry may provide some benefit to national economies, 
Basel III is unlikely to provide significant protections from future 
crises if economies face instability on par with that of the Great 
Recession. 
 
